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Abstract
In this paper, we establish the Bayesian foundations of type structures in
which beliefs are lexicographic probability systems (LPS’s)—such as those used
in Brandenburger et al. (2008)—rather than standard probability measures as
in Mertens and Zamir (1985). This is a setting which the distinction between
preferences hierarchies (Epstein and Wang, 1996) and beliefs hierarchies is
meaningful and the former has conceptual advantages. Type structures in
which beliefs are conditional probability systems (CPS’s) are found to describe
fewer hierarchies than LPS type structures can if a nonredundancy requirement
is imposed. The two families of type structures are found to be capable of
describing the same set of hierarchies in the absence of such a requirement. The
existence of “largest”—a notion closely related to universality—LPS/CPS type
structures is also shown. Finally, we find that some coherent hierarchies cannot
be types but those hierarchies may be needed to express epistemic conditions
for iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
∗This is a preliminary working paper.
†E-mail: byungsoolee@rotman.utoronto.ca / Address: Rotman School of Management, Uni-
versity of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 3E6.
1 INTRODUCTION
Blume et al. (1991b) showed that Nash equilibrium refinements such as admissible1
equilibrium, perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) and proper equilibrium (Myerson,
1978) could be more simply characterized using lexicographic probability systems
(LPS’s Blume et al., 1991a) instead of infinite sequences of probability measures. Such
equilibrium refinements on normal-form games have implications on rational behavior
in extensive-form games. For example, in the words of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986),
“given a game tree, a proper equilibrium of its normal form will give a sequential
equilibrium in any variant of that tree obtained by applying any of the. . . inessential
transformations.”
Conditional probability systems (CPS’s), as used by Myerson (1986) and Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (1999) to describe beliefs in extensive-form games, can also be viewed
as LPS’s satisfying some restrictions on the set of events on which beliefs can be
conditioned (cf. Hammond, 1994; Halpern, 2010). It is not unreasonable to hypothesize
that normal-form analogs of various epistemic analyses of rationality in extensive-form
games that use CPS’s could be formulated by using LPS’s.
While LPS’s have the potential to be useful to analyses in the aforementioned
settings, there was little progress on the use of LPS’s to state conditions on beliefs
about beliefs until Brandenburger et al. (2008) provided an epistemic characterization
of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Their solution to the long-
standing puzzle involved conditions that could not be expressed using the standard
frameworks in which beliefs are represented by probability measures.
However, some nontrivial conceptual questions have been raised by the use of
LPS type structures—i.e., type structures in which types are mapped to LPS beliefs
about other types—in Brandenburger et al. (2008). In order to answer these questions,
the foundations of LPS type structures and their connection to beliefs hierarchies
must be established in the same way that papers like Mertens and Zamir (1985) and
Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) did for standard probability type structures. The
related issues are briefly enumerated and summarized below. The first and second
issues are given more detailed treatment in Lee (2013).
Issue 1 Brandenburger et al. (2008) use type structures in which beliefs are lexico-
graphic conditional probability systems (LCPS). That is, types are mapped to beliefs
that are naturally interpreted as CPS’s. When we refer to CPS’s in the remainder of
this paper, we will mean LCPS’s. However, the finite-order beliefs implied by such
type structures are not CPS’s themselves.
Issue 2 The distinction between CPS’s and LPS’s disappears when the underlying
space of uncertainty contains duplicate elements that represent the same descrip-
tions of reality. The set of LPS’s over any space of uncertainty, when interpreted
1i.e., equilibrium in undominated strategies
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as representations of preferences over acts that are consistent with the axioms of
Blume et al. (1991a), contain continuum-many duplicate representations of the same
preferences. An immediate and stark consequence of this fact is that it there is
that there is no difference—as preferences over preferences a` la Epstein and Wang
(1996)—between LPS beliefs about LPS beliefs and CPS beliefs about LPS beliefs
unless such redundancies are eliminated.
Issue 3 Keisler and Lee (2012) shows that two CPS type structures that describe
the exact same set of beliefs hierarchies can differ in whether they permit the existence
of states that satisfy rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR)—
Brandenburger et al. (2008)’s epistemic condition for iterated admissibility. It is
unclear whether the distinction between LPS type structures and CPS type structures
as far as this epistemic condition is concerned.
Issue 4 The epistemic condition for iterated admissibility formulated by Bran-
denburger et al. (2008) is RCAR in complete LPS type structures. Complete type
structures are large type structures in the sense that the mappings from types to
beliefs are surjective. Given that RCAR exists in some (cf. Keisler and Lee, 2012) but
not all (cf. Brandenburger et al., 2008) complete CPS type structures, the question of
what the “largest” CPS type structure is becomes relevant.
In this paper, we construct the set of all coherent hierarchies of lexicographic
expected utility (LEU) preferences so that no two hierarchies in the set represent
the same preferences hierarchy. We then obtain the somewhat suprising result that
the set of LEU preferences hierarchies does not coincide with the set of LPS beliefs
hierarchies. In particular, there are some LEU preferences hierarchies that cannot be
represented by types!
We also establish the existence of an LPS type structure that is “largest” in the
sense of inducing all hierarchies that can be described by all other LPS type structures.
An analogous result is proven for CPS type structures without redundant types.
We also formally establish the ways in which the descriptive powers of LPS type
structures and CPS type structures differ. If redundant types are permitted, a hierarchy
can be described by an LPS type structure if and only if it can be described by an
CPS type structure. In the absence of redundant types, some hierarchies cannot be
induced by CPS type structures. That said, if an epistemic condition can be stated
using only finite-order beliefs, CPS type structures and LPS type structures are shown
to be equally powerful.
Finally, we provide epistemic conditions for iterated admissibility that are for-
mulated in an explicit model of preferences hierarchies as opposed to in an implicit
model such as a type structure. As a byproduct, it is revealed that, regardless of how
we topologize the spaces of finite-order beliefs, there are preferences hierarchies that
satisfy this analog of Brandenburger et al. (2008)’s RCAR but cannot be types.
2
2 CONDITIONAL BELIEFS AND LEU PREFERENCES
2.1 PRELIMINARIES
Following Savage (1954), the beliefs considered in this paper are “personalistic” in the
sense that they capture the degrees of confidence that a decision maker has in various
statements. These degrees of confidence are reflected in her choices over menus of acts
that promise utility prizes contingent on resolutions of uncertainty.
Definition 1. Let X be a topological space. X is a Polish space if its topology
Top(X) is separable and completely metrizable.
Definition 2. Let X be a topological space. X is a standard Borel space if X is a
Borel subset of some Polish space Y and Top(X) is the subspace topology with respect
to Y . Equivalently, X is a standard Borel space if its Borel sets can be generated by
a Polish topology.
For Definitions 3–9, let X be a standard Borel space.
Definition 3. An act defined on X is a bounded Borel map f : X → [0, 1]. The set
of all acts defined on X is denoted by Act(X).
Definition 4. The set of all probability Borel measures defined on X is denoted
by P(X), which is itself a standard Borel space.2
Definition 5. A lexicographic probability system (LPS) defined on X is a finite
sequence of probability measures on X.
∀n ∈ N Ln(X) ≡
n∏
j=1
P(X) L(X) ≡
⊎
n∈N
L(X)
≡ set of all length-n LPS’s ≡ set of all LPS’s
The sets Ln(X) and L(X) are standard Borel spaces under appropriate topologies.3
Definition 6. Let σ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ L(X) and f ∈ Act(X). The lexicographic
expected utility of f under σ is the following n-tuple of expected utilities.
Eσ f ≡
(∫
f dµ1, . . . ,
∫
f dµn
)
= (Eµ1f, . . . , Eµnf)
Definition 7. Each LPS σ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ L(X) defines the preference relation %σ
on Act(X) as follows, where ≥L is the lexicographic order.4
∀f, g ∈ Act(X) f %σ g ⇐⇒ Eσ f ≥L Eσ g
2If X is a Polish space, then the weak* topology on P(X) is Polish.
3Ln(X) has the product topology and L(X) is a topological union.
4***
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Definition 8. Probability measures µ, ν ∈ P(X) are mutually singular if there
exist disjoint Borel sets U, V ⊆ X such that µ(U) = ν(V ) = 1. We write µ ⊥ ν to
denote the fact that µ and ν are mutually singular.5
Definition 9. An LPS σ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ Ln(X) is a conditional probability
system (CPS) if its component measures µ1, . . . , µn are pairwise mutually singular.
Equivalently, σ is a CPS if there exists a family {U1, . . . , Un} of pairwise disjoint Borel
sets such that µ1(U1) = · · · = µn(Un) = 1. C(X) denotes the set of all CPS’s on X.
For all n ∈ N, Cn(X) ≡ C(X) ∩ Ln(X).
2.2 REDUNDANCY AND CONDITIONAL BELIEFS ABOUT BELIEFS
Let X be a standard Borel space. Unlike the space P(X) of probability measures, the
space L(X) contains distinct beliefs that represent the same preference relation on
acts.
Definition 10. Let ρ, σ ∈ L(X). We say that ρ, σ are preference-equivalent if
%ρ=%σ and write ρ ∼= σ.
In fact, each LPS σ ∈ L(X) is preference-equivalent to an uncountable number of
LPS’s in L(X). This poses nontrivial conceptual challenges to meaningfully defining
what is a conditional belief (i.e., CPS) about beliefs (i.e., LPS’s).6 The most obvious of
these challenges is that the mutual singularity of probability measures—and therefore
the distinction between CPS’s and LPS’s—loses its incisiveness in the presence of such
redundancies.
For example, consider the space C(L(X)). If the subjectivist interpretation is
taken seriously, it might be argued that the substantive content of an LPS σ ∈ L(X)
is entirely captured by the associated preference relation %σ. As such, one might then
argue that beliefs about beliefs have content only to the extent that they describe
beliefs about preferences. The contents of L(L(X)) and C(L(X)) are essentially the
same in that regard. As such, removing redundant beliefs from L(X) is a practical
necessity if we want to make meaningful statements involving conditional beliefs about
LEU preferences.
2.3 MARGINAL PREFERENCES
The concept of marginal beliefs is essential to the construction of beliefs about beliefs.
Again, it may be argued that, under the personalistic interpretation, the substantive
content of marginal beliefs should be marginal preferences. For Definitions 11–14,
5A probability measure can be viewed as an element of some linear space. A pair of mutually
singular probability measures can be viewed as a pair of orthogonal vectors in this space.
6Lee (2013) contains a more detailed discussion of these issues.
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Definition 11. Let X, Y be nonempty standard Borel spaces and % a preference
relation on Act(X×Y ). Then % induces a marginal preference relation on Act(X),
which is denoted by margX %. Formally, the statement %X= margX % is equivalent
to the following.7
∀f, g ∈ Act(X) f %X g ⇐⇒ f % g.
Definition 12. Let X, Y be nonempty standard Borel spaces. The marginal belief
operator (marg) on LPS’s is defined as follows.
∀σ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ L(X × Y ) margX σ ≡ (margX µ1, . . . ,margX µn)
It is easy to see that margX σ represents the marginal preference relation margX %σ
on Act(X). However, the marginal belief operator on LPS’s displays an irregularity
that the marginal belief operator on probability measures does not. There exist LPS’s
ρ, σ ∈ L(X × Y ) such that their marginal beliefs on X are preference-equivalent but
not equal. Formally, this is stated as follows.
∀µ, ν ∈ P(X × Y ) margX µ ∼= margX ν ⇐⇒ margX µ = margX ν
∃ρ, σ ∈ L(X × Y ) margX ρ ∼= margX σ ∧margX ρ 6= margX σ
Unfortunately, this behavior of the marginal operator on LPS’s is not merely a
technical artifact; it has conceptual implications. The marginal LPS margX σ—of
some σ ∈ L(X × Y )—describes more aspects of %σ than margX %σ does. As was
the case in the previous section, the redundancy of L(X) of plays a role in bringing
about this irregularity. However, these issues can be sidestepped by appealing to the
following result.
Proposition 1 (Lee (2013)). Let X be a nonempty standard Borel space. There exists
a Borel subset U(X) ⊆ L(X) and a surjective Borel map sX : L(X)→ U(X) such that
1. sX(σ) ∼= sX(σ′) ⇐⇒ σ ∼= σ′ for all σ, σ′ ∈ L(X); and
2. σ ∼= sX(σ) for all σ ∈ L(X).
Furthermore, U(X) only contains minimal-length representations of LEU preferences.
Definition 13. For each standard Borel space X, fix a set U(X) and a map sX that
exist by Proposition 1. For all n ∈ N, Un(X) ≡ U(X) ∩ Ln(X).
The sets U(X) and L(X) describe the same set of preferences, but U(X) does not
suffer from the presence of redundant representations. It follows that L(U(X)) and
C(U(X)) differ in meaningful ways. Furthermore, the map sX permits the definition
of a well-behaved marginal operator that does not exhibit the conceptual problems
discussed in this section.
7Note that any f ∈ Act(X) can be viewed as the map (x, y) 7→ f(x) that belongs to Act(X × Y ).
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Definition 14. Let X, Y be nonempty standard Borel spaces. The marginal pref-
erence operator (margp) on LPS’s is defined as follows.
∀σ ∈ L(X × Y ) margpX σ ≡ sX(margX σ)
The mapping σ 7→ margX σ is Borel since it is a composition of Borel maps. Further-
more, the following statement is readily verified.
∀ρ, σ ∈ L(X × Y ) margpX ρ ∼= margpX σ ⇐⇒ margpX ρ = margpX σ
3 INTERACTIVE UNCERTAINTY
3.1 BASIC ENVIRONMENT
Consider a game setting where I = {a, b} denotes the set of all human players.8
Players a and b are respectively called Ann and Bob.9 Our definitions and results
easily extend to environments with any finite number of players.
Each player has a basic (i.e., first-order) state, which is known to herself but not
to her opponents. For all i ∈ I, the set of Player i’s first-order states is denoted
by X1i , which is assumed to be a standard Borel space. Player i is uncertain about
the first-order state of her opponents. Her attitude toward this uncertainty is fully
captured by her preferences over the set Act(X1−i). Naturally, these are called her
first-order preferences.
3.2 HIGHER-ORDER PREFERENCES
For all n ∈ N, the set of Player i’s nth-order states is denoted by Xni and the set of her
nth-order preferences is denoted by Hni . The sets X
n
i and H
n
i are defined in parallel
by induction as follows:
∀n ∈ N Hni ≡ U(Xn−i)
base case: X2i ≡ X1i ×H1i
∀n ≥ 2 Xn+1i ≡ {(xni , hni ) ∈ Xni ×Hni : projHn−1i x
n
i = margpXn−1−i h
n
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
coherency condition
}
It is apparent from the definition of Xn+1i that each (x
n
i , h
n
i ) ∈ Xn+1i describes
Player i’s (n− 1)th-order preferences in two places:
projHn−1i x
n
i margpXn−1−i h
n
i
The coherency condition requires that these descriptions are mutually consistent. In
other words, the diagram in Figure 1 commutes for all n ≥ 2.
Lemma 1. For all n ∈ N, Xni and Hni are nonempty standard Borel spaces.
8We adopt the usual convention that −a ≡ b and −b ≡ a.
9We adopt the convention of using female pronouns when we refer to generic players whose gender
is unknown (e.g., Player i ∈ I knows her own preferences).
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Xn+1i H
n
i
Xni H
n−1
i
proj
proj
margp
Xn−1−i
proj
Figure 1: Coherency condition
3.3 COHERENT HIERARCHIES
Finally, we can define hierarchies of preferences, which are the objects of principal
interest to us.
Definition 15. A coherent preferences hierarchy of Player i is a sequence hi =
(h1i , h
2
i , . . . ) ∈
∏
n∈NH
n
i =
∏
n∈N U(Xn−i) such that the beliefs that form the sequence
are mutually consistent. Formally, the set Hi of all coherent hierarchies is defined as
follows:
Hi ≡
{
(h1i , h
2
i , . . . ) ∈
∏
n∈N
Hni : ∀n ∈ N margpXn−i h
n+1
i = h
n
i
}
Definition 16. A player state of Player i is a sequence (x1i , x
2
i , . . . ) ∈
∏
n∈NX
n
i such
that the higher-order states that form the sequence are mutually consistent. Formally,
the set Xi of all player states is defined as follows.
Xi ≡ lim←−
n
Xni =
{
(x1i , x
2
i , . . . ) ∈
∏
n∈N
Xni : ∀n ∈ N projXni x
n+1
i = x
n
i
}
There is an obvious and natural isomorphism between Xi and X
1
i ×Hi.
(xni )n∈N 7→ (x1i , (projHni x
n+1
i )n∈N)
It follows that we may use the following alternate definition of player states.
Definition 17. Elements of X1i ×Hi are called player states of i.
Lemma 2. Xi and Hi are nonempty standard Borel spaces.
3.4 FROM BELIEFS ABOUT STATES TO HIERARCHIES
Definition 18. The canonical map hi : L(X−i)→ Hi that extracts from each element
of L(X−i) the preferences hierarchy it implies is defined as follows:
∀n ∈ N hi(bi;n) ≡ margpXn−i bi hi(bi) ≡ (hi(bi;n))n∈N
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Lemma 3. The map hi is Borel. Furthermore, ρ ∼= σ if and only if hi(ρ) = hi(σ) for
all ρ, σ ∈ L(X−i).
An immediate consequence of Lemma 3 is that hi|U(X−i) and hi|C(X−i) are one-to-one.
Corollary 1. A hierarchy can be expressed as an LPS in L(X−i) if and only if it can
be expressed as an LPS in U(X−i). In other words,
hi(L(X−i)) = hi(U(X−i)).
Furthermore, the set of all such hierarchies—i.e., hi(L(X−i))—is Borel in Hi.
Proof of Corollary 1. First, note that hi(L(X−i)) ⊇ hi(U(X−i)) because L(X−i) ⊇
U(X−i). For all ρ ∈ L(X−i), there exists a σ ∈ U(X−i) such that ρ ∼= σ. By Lemma 3,
ρ ∼= σ implies that hi(ρ) = hi(σ). It follows that hi(L(X−i)) ⊆ hi(U(X−i)).
Since U(X−i) is free of redundant beliefs, the restriction of the Borel map hi to
U(X−i) is one-to-one. This implies that the inverse mapping (hi|U(X−i))−1 is Borel as
well. Therefore, hi(L(X−i)) = hi(U(X−i)) is Borel.
Theorem 1. Not every coherent hierarchy can be expressed as an LPS on player
states. In other words, hi(L(X−i)) 6= Hi.
Proof of Theorem 1. If X1i is not a singleton for at least one i ∈ I, then the space Xj
is uncountable for all j ∈ I. Without loss of generality, let Xi be uncountable for all
i ∈ I.
Fix a x−i ∈ X−i and let a(1) ≡ x−i. Now, for each n ∈ N, we can choose an
a(n+ 1) ∈ X−i such that
projXn−i a(n+ 1) = projXn−i a(n) ∧ projXn+1−i a(n+ 1) 6= projXn+1−i a(n).
Due to the coherency condition imposed on X−i, the following must then hold for all
m,n ∈ N.
m ≤ m =⇒ projXm−i a(n) = projXm−i a(m)
m > n =⇒ projXm−i a(n) 6= projXm−i a(m)
We can define a sequence (µn)n of probability measures in P(X−i) such that µn(a(n)) =
1 for all n ∈ N. Define the hierarchy (hni )n ∈ Hi as follows using these measures.
∀n ∈ N hni ≡ (hi(µn;n), hi(µn−1;n), . . . , hi(µ1;n))
Note that hi(µm;n)(projXn−i a(k)) = 1 for all m ≤ n. It follows that hni is a CPS and
has minimal length. Furthermore, hi is a coherent hierarchy because the following
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holds for all n ∈ N.
margXn−i h
n+1
i
=
n+ 1 measures︷ ︸︸ ︷
(margXn−i hi(µn+1;n+ 1),margXn−i hi(µn;n+ 1), . . . ,margXn−i hi(µ1;n+ 1))
=
n+ 1 measures︷ ︸︸ ︷
(hi(µn+1;n), hi(µn;n), . . . , hi(µ1;n))
∼=
n measures︷ ︸︸ ︷
(hi(µn;n), . . . , hi(µ1;n)) = h
n
i ∵ hi(µn+1;n) = hi(µn;n)
Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists an LPS σ ∈ L(X−i) that represents
hi. Its length must be some N ∈ N. The (N + 1)th-order preferences implied by σ can
then be represented by margXN+1i
σ, which must have length N . However, hN+1i , which
has length N + 1, cannot be represented by a shorter LPS. Since hN+1i
∼= margXN+1i σ,
this yields a contradiction.
4 TYPE STRUCTURES
4.1 FROM TYPES TO HIERARCHIES
Definition 19. An L-type structure is a tuple 〈Ti, βi〉i∈I such that the following
holds for all i ∈ I:
1. Ti is a nonempty standard Borel space; and
2. βi : Ti → L(X1−i × T−i) is a Borel map.
Let T = 〈Ti, βi〉i∈I . T is also called a P-type structure if βi(Ti) ⊆ P(X1−i×T−i) for
all i; and a C-type structure if βi(Ti) ⊆ C(X1−i × T−i) for all i. The set Ti is called
Player i’s type space and elements of Ti are called types. The map βi is called her
type-belief map.
The familiar type structures of Mertens and Zamir (1985); Brandenburger and
Dekel (1993); Tan and Werlang (1988) are P-type structures. The lexicographic type
structures in Brandenburger et al. (2008) are C-type structures.
It immediately apparent that the higher-order preferences, and therefore the coher-
ent hierarchy, implied by a type can be recovered by repeatedly taking compositions
of the type-belief maps. Before we do so, it is useful to first extend the notion of
pushforward measures to LPS’s.
Definition 20. Let X, Y be standard Borel spaces and f : X → Y a Borel map.
Given a µ ∈ P(Y ), the pushforward belief fµ ∈ P(X) is the probability measure
defined as follows
∀E ∈ B(X) fµ(E) ≡ µ(f−1(E))
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Definition 21. Let X, Y be standard Borel spaces and f : X → Y a Borel map.
Given a σ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ L(Y ), the pushforward belief fσ ∈ L(X) is defined as
follows.
fσ ≡ (fµ1, . . . , fµn)
Let T = 〈Ti, βi〉i∈I be an L-type structure. We can inductively define a sequence of
Borel maps (βni )n∈N such that β
n
i : Ti → Hni recovers the nth-order preferences implied
by each type.
ti 7→ β1i (ti) ≡ margpX1−i βi(ti)
∀n ∈ N ti 7→ βn+1i (ti) ≡ margpXn+1−i β˜
n
−iβi(ti)
The one-to-one Borel map β˜ni : X
1
i × Ti → Xn+1i × Ti is defined as follows.
(x1i , ti) 7→ β˜ni (x1i , ti) ≡ (x1i , β1i (ti), . . . , βni (ti), ti) ∈
⊇Xni ×Hni ×Ti⊇Xn+1i ×Ti︷ ︸︸ ︷
X1i ×H1i × · · · ×Hni × Ti
The LPS β˜n−iβi(ti)—i.e., the pushforward of βi(ti) ∈ L(X1−i × T−i) under β˜n−i—is a
belief about Xn+1−i × T−i.
Definition 22. Let T = 〈Ti, βi〉i∈I be an L-type structure and let the family of maps
{βni : (i, n) ∈ I × N} be defined as above. For each i ∈ I, Player i’s type-hierarchy
map is the function β∞i : Ti → Hi, which is defined as follows.
ti
β∞i7−→ (βni (ti))n∈N
Given a type-belief map βi, the associated type-hierarchy map is indicated by adding
the superscript ∞.
Lemma 4. Let T = 〈Ti, βi〉i∈I be an L-type structure. The type-hierarchy map
β∞i : Ti → Hi is Borel for each i ∈ I.
Harsanyi (1967)’s insight that hierarchies, which are cumbersome objects, can
be represented by types, which are comparatively simple objects, inspired numerous
papers establishing the foundations of various type structures. A recurring theme
in these investigations is whether there is a type structure that can describe “all
higher-order beliefs”—a notion that varies according to the context in which the
question is asked. Following several recent papers, we use terminality in this paper
as an umbrella term to describe such properties of type structures.10 The following
common variants of the terminality question are considered.
10The word universality has also been used frequently.
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Definition 23. Let T = 〈Ti, βi〉i∈I be an L-type structure and 〈β∞i 〉i∈I its type-
hierarchy maps.
1. strongly terminal if it describes every coherent preferences hierarchy, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I β∞i (Ti) = Hi
2. weakly terminal in a given family F of L-type structures if it describes every
coherent preferences hierarchy that can be described by type structures in F ,
i.e.,
∀〈Yi, γi〉 ∈ F ∀i ∈ I γ∞i (Ti) ⊆ β∞i (Ti)
3. finitely terminal if it describes all finite-order preferences, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I ∀n ∈ N projHni β
∞
i (Ti) = H
n
i
Corollary 2. No strongly terminal L-type structure exists.
Proof of Corollary 2. Let T = 〈Ti, βi〉i∈I be an L-type structure. For each ti ∈ Ti, the
belief in L(X1−i ×H−i) = L(X−i) to which βi(ti) ∈ L(X1−i × T−i) corresponds can be
obtained via the type-hierarchy maps. Therefore, hierarchies that can be described
by T can also be described as beliefs about the opponents’ player states—i.e., beliefs
about X−i. Since Theorem 1 states that some hierarchies cannot be described thusly,
it follows that those hierarchies cannot be described by T.
4.2 CANONICAL TYPE STRUCTURES
U1i ≡ hi(U(X−i)) ⊆ Hi
∀n ≥ 2 Un+1i ≡ hi({σ ∈ U(X−i) : σ(X1−i × Un−i) = ~1}) ⊆ Uni
T Ui ≡
⋂
n∈N
Uni
Definition 24. The canonical LPS type structure is the tuple TU ≡ 〈T Ui , βUi 〉i∈I such
that βUi : T
U
i → U(X1−i × T U−i) is the mapping ti 7→ h−1i (ti).
C1i ≡ hi(C(X1−i ×H−i)) ⊆ Hi
∀n ≥ 2 Cn+1i ≡ hi({σ ∈ C(X−i) : σ(X1−i × Cn−i) = ~1}) ⊆ Cni
T Ci ≡
⋂
n∈N
Cni
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Definition 25. The canonical CPS type structure is the tuple TC ≡ 〈T Ci , βCi 〉i∈I such
that βCi : T
C
i → C(X1−i × T C−i) is the mapping ti 7→ h−1i (ti).
Lemma 5. TU and TC are L-type structures and their type-belief maps are Borel
isomorphisms.
Proof of Lemma 5. By Lemma 3, hi is a one-to-one Borel map when its domain is
restricted to a nonredundant set of LPS’s. For any nonempty standard Borel space
X, C(X) and U(X) are nonredundant Borel sets of LPS’s. For all (i, n) ∈ I × N, Uni
and Cni are Borel because they are images of nonredundant Borel sets of LPS’s under
one-to-one Borel maps. It follows that T Ui and T
C
i are Borel sets for all i ∈ I.
For any nonempty standard Borel space X, P(X) ⊆ C(X) ⊆ L(X). It follows that
both TU and TC contain the Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) type structure, which
is nonempty.
LEU preferences satisfy the limit closure property—i.e., if a sequence of Borel sets
are 1-believed in the sense that their complements are Savage-null, then the intersection
of those sets is also 1-believed in the same sense.11 Therefore, the equalities below
hold.
T Ui = hi(U(X1−i × T U−i)) T Ci = hi(C(X1−i × T C−i))
It follows that the restriction of hi to U(X1−i × T U−i) is a Borel isomorphism from
U(X1−i×T U−i) and T Ui ; and the restriction of hi to C(X1−i×T C−i) is a Borel isomorphism
from C(X1−i × T C−i) and T Ci . The type-belief maps in TU and TC, being the functional
inverses of those restrictions, are also Borel isomorphisms.
Theorem 2. TU is weakly terminal in the class of L-type structures.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let T = 〈Ti, βi〉i be an L-type structure. We want to show that
∀ti ∈ Ti β∞i (ti) ∈ T Ui .
Define β˜∞i as the following map.
(x1i , ti) 7→ (x1i , β∞i (ti), ti) X1i × Ti → Xi × Ti
For each ti ∈ Ti, the hierarchy β∞i (ti) can also be represented by the belief
margpX−i β˜
∞
−iβi(ti) ∈ U(X−i) = U(X1−i ×H−i).
It follows that β∞i (ti) ∈ U1i = hi(U(X1−i × H−i)). Furthermore, β∞i (ti) belongs
to U2i —i.e., the set of hierarchies that can be represented as beliefs that 1-believe
11In the literature, 1-belief, or simply belief, of an event E corresponds to belief with probability 1.
Extending this notion to LPS’s, an event E is 1-believed under LPS (µ1, . . . , µn) if µ1(E) = · · · =
µn(E) = 1.
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X1−i×U1−i—because β∞−i(t−i) ∈ U1−i for all t−i ∈ T−i. By applying this line of argument
inductively, it is shown that
β∞i (ti) ∈
⋂
n∈N
Uni = T
U
i .
5 HIERARCHIES THAT ARE CONDITIONAL BELIEFS
5.1 REDUNDANT TYPES
Consider a L-type structure 〈Ti, βi〉i∈I . Each ti ∈ Ti represents a belief βi(ti) about
X1−i× T−i. As briefly discussed in Section 2.2, the statement that βi(ti) is a CPS loses
its meaning when the space of uncertainty—i.e., X1−i × T−i—contains elements that
are redundant with respect to the uncertainty that we wish to model. In the case of
type structures, what we wish to model is uncertainty about hierarchies. As such, the
set T−i is descriptively useful only to the extent that it describes hierarchies in H−i.
We can define when a type structure is redundant in that regard.
Definition 26. Let T = 〈Ti, βi〉i∈I be an L-type structure and 〈β∞i 〉i∈I its type-
hierarchy maps. A type ti ∈ Ti is redundant if
∃tˆi ∈ Ti ti 6= tˆi ∧ β∞i (ti) = β∞i (tˆi).
We say that T is redundant if there is a Player i such that redundant types exist in
Ti.
Any preferences hierarchy that can be described by a L-type structure can also be
described by a (possibly redundant) C-type structure. This is an implication of the
following result.
Theorem 3. There exists a C-type structure that is weakly terminal in the class of
L-type structures.
Proof of Theorem 3. We wish to construct an L-type structure T = 〈Ti, βi〉i. Let
Ti = N× T Ui . We will define the map βi : Ti → C(X1−i × T−i) in a piecewise fashion.
First, for each m ∈ N, the space {m}×Ti admits the following countable partition
into Borel sets.
Π(m) = {Pmn = {(m, ti) ∈ Ti : βUi (ti) ∈ Ln(X1−i × T−i)} : n ∈ N}
For any m,n ∈ N, the function βi can be defined on the subdomain Pmn ∈ Π(m) as
follows:
βi(m, ti) ≡ (f1µ1, . . . , fnµn) ∈ C(X1−i × T−i), where βUi (ti) = (µ1, . . . , µn)
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and fk : X
1
−i× T U−i → X1−i×{k}× T U−i is the Borel map (x1−it−i) 7→ (x1−i, k, t−i) for all
k ∈ N. The map βi is clearly Borel on Pmn for all m,n ∈ N. It follows that βi is Borel
on
⋃
Π(m) =
⋃
n∈N Pmn because Π(m) is countable. Therefore, βi is Borel on each
member of the countable partition{⋃
Π(m) : m ∈ N
}
of Ti. It follows that βi is a Borel map.
Finally, T generates the same hierarchies as TU because the following equality
holds for all (m, ti) ∈ Ti by construction.
margX1−i×TU−i βi(m, ti) = β
U
i (ti)
Since TU is weakly terminal, so is T.
In contrast, not every preferences hierarchy that can be described by a L-type
structure can also be described by a nonredundant C-type structure. Furthermore, the
canonical C-type structure describes precisely the set of hierarchies that are described
by nonredundant C-type structures.
Theorem 4. The canonical C-type structure TC is
1. weakly terminal in the class of nonredundant C-type structures; but
2. not weakly terminal in the class of C-type structures.12
Proof of Theorem 4. Let T = 〈Ti, βi〉i be a nonredundant C-type structure. We want
to show that
∀ti ∈ Ti β∞i (ti) ∈ T Ci .
Define fi as the following one-to-one Borel map. The map is one-to-one because T is
nonredundant.
(x1i , ti) 7→ (x1i , β∞i (ti)) X1i × Ti → X1i ×Hi
For each ti ∈ Ti, the hierarchy β∞i (ti) can also be represented by the belief
f−iβi(ti) ∈ C(X−i) = C(X1−i ×H−i).
Again, f−iβi(ti) is a CPS because βi(ti) is a CPS and f−i is one-to-one. It follows that
β∞i (ti) ∈ C1i = hi(C(X1−i × H−i)). Furthermore, β∞i (ti) belongs to C2i —i.e., the set
of hierarchies that can be represented as beliefs that 1-believe X1−i × C1−i—because
β∞−i(t−i) ∈ C1−i for all t−i ∈ T−i. By applying this line of argument inductively, it is
shown that
β∞i (ti) ∈
⋂
n∈N
Cni = T
C
i .
12It is also therefore not weakly terminal in the class of L-type structures.
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In light of the preceding results, it makes sense to restrict our attention to nonre-
dundant C-type structures when we are interested in CPS beliefs about hierarchies.
5.2 “PROPER” CPS TYPES ARE ALMOST LPS TYPES
Although nonredundant C-type structures describe a strict subset of the hierarchies
that are described by L-type structures, the two nevertheless have equal descriptive
power in the following important way.
Theorem 5. The canonical C-type structure TC is finitely terminal in the class of
L-type structures.
Proof of Theorem 5. TC is a belief-complete C-type structure in the sense that βCi (T Ci ) =
C(X1−i × T C−i). For all nonempty standard Borel spaces X, Y, U such that U ⊆ X × Y
and projX U = X, the set
{margX σ : σ ∈ L(U)}
is equal to L(X). The following statements can then be sequentially derived.
margX1−i β
C
i (T
C
i ) = L(X1−i)
∴ margpX1−i β
C
i (T
C
i ) = U(X1−i) = H1i
∴ projH1i T
C
i = H
1
i and projX2i =X1i ×H1i X
1
i × T Ci = X2i
Now assume the induction hypothesis—for induction on n ∈ N—that projXmi X1i ×T Ci =
Xmi for all m ≤ n.
margXn−i β
C
i (T
C
i ) = L(Xn−i)
∴ margpXn−i β
C
i (T
C
i ) = U(Xn−i) = Hni
∴ projHni T
C
i = H
n
i
Given that T Ui is a set of coherent hierarchies, projXn+1i X
1
i × T Ci = Xn+1i whenever
projHni T
C
i = H
n
i
An important implication of Theorem 5 is that, for the purposes of analyzing
epistemic conditions involving finite-order beliefs, there is effectively no difference
between L-type structures and nonredundant C-type structures. To put it another
way, every coherent preferences hierarchy can be approximated by a sequence of types
in nonredundant C-type structures.
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6 COMMON ASSUMPTION OF RATIONALITY
6.1 ADMISSIBILITY
Definition 27. Let G = 〈Sa, Sb, pia, pib〉 be a finite game.
1. Strategy si ∈ Si is 1-admissible—or simply admissible—if it is not weakly
dominated in the game G.
2. Strategy si ∈ Si is m-admissible—for m > 1—if it is admissible in the reduced
game obtained by removing all strategies of either player that are not (m− 1)-
admissible.
3. Strategy si ∈ Si is iteratively admissible (IA) if it is m-admissible for all
m ∈ N.
4. For all m ∈ N, Smi denotes the set of Player i’s m-admissible strategies. The set
of Player i’s IA strategies is denoted by S∞i ≡
⋃
m∈N S
m
i .
6.2 EPISTEMIC CONDITION FOR ITERATED ADMISSIBLITY
Consider a finite game 〈Sa, Sb, pia, pib〉 of complete information. The symbols Si and
pii respectively denote Player i’s strategy set and utility function. The fundamental
uncertainty of each player concerns the strategy played by her opponent (i.e., X1i = Si).
Definition 28. Let X be a standard Borel space. An LPS σ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ L(X)
has full-support if
n⋃
j=1
suppµj = X.
The set of all full-support LPS’s on X is denoted by L+(X). The sets C+(X) and
U+(X) are defined analogously:
C+(X) ≡ C(X) ∩ L+(X) U+(X) ≡ U(X) ∩ L+(X)
Definition 29. The hierarchy hi = (h
1
i , h
2
i , . . . ) ∈ Hi has full-support if each finite-
order belief in the sequence has full-support, i.e.,
∀n ∈ N hni ∈ L+(Xn−i).
Definition 30. Let X be a standard Borel space, σ ∈ L(X), and E ⊆ X a Borel set.
We say that event E is assumed under σ if there exists some ρ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈
Ln(E) such that
1. σ ∼= ρ; and
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2. there exists m ≤ n such that ρ|m = (µ1, . . . , µm) ∈ L+(E) and µM(E) = 0 for
all M > m.
Definition 31. The player state (si, hi) ∈ Si × Hi is said to be rational if hi has
full-support and si maximizes LEU with respect to the first-order belief h
1
i . Let R
1
i
denote the set of all such pairs.
Definition 32. A player state satisfies rationality and mth-order assumption of
rationality (RmAR) if it belongs to the following set.
Rm+1i ≡ Rmi ∩ {(si, (hni )n) ∈ Si ×Hi : hm+1i assumes (projXm+1−i R
m
−i)}
Definition 33. A player state satisfies rationality and common assumption of
rationality (RCAR) if it belongs to the following set.
R∞i ≡
⋂
n∈N
Rmi
Theorem 6. For all m ∈ N, projSi Rmi = Smi .
Proof of Theorem 6. By Lemma 7, projSi R
k
i \Rk+1i = Ski for all k.
Rmi =
∞⋃
k=m
(Rki \Rk+1i )
projSi R
m
i =
∞⋃
k=m
projSi(R
k
i \Rk+1i ) =
∞⋃
k=m
Ski = S
m
i
∵ S1i ⊇ S2i ⊇ S3i ⊇ . . .
Theorem 7. R∞i is nonempty and projSi R
∞
i = S
∞
i .
Proof of Theorem 7. See Appendix.
APPENDIX A TYPES TO HIERARCHIES
In order to recover hierarchies from types, it is useful to extend the notion of pushfor-
ward measures to LPS’s.
Definition 34. Let X, Y be standard Borel spaces and f : X → Y a Borel map.
Given a µ ∈ P(Y ), the pushforward belief fµ ∈ P(X) is the probability measure
defined as follows
∀E ∈ B(X) fµ(E) ≡ µ(f−1(E))
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Definition 35. Let X, Y be standard Borel spaces and f : X → Y a Borel map.
Given a σ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ L(Y ), the pushforward belief fσ ∈ L(X) is defined as
follows.
fσ ≡ (fµ1, . . . , fµn)
Let T = 〈Ti, βi〉i∈I be an L-type structure. We can inductively define a sequence of
Borel maps (βni )n∈N such that β
n
i : Ti → Hni recovers the nth-order preferences implied
by each type.
ti 7→ β1i (ti) ≡ margpX1−i βi(ti)
∀n ∈ N ti 7→ βn+1i (ti) ≡ margpXn+1−i β
n
−iβi(ti)
The one-to-one Borel map β˜ni : X
1
i × Ti → Xn+1i × Ti is defined as follows.
(x1i , ti) 7→ β˜ni (x1i , ti) ≡ (x1i , β1i (ti), . . . , βni (ti), ti) ∈
⊆X1i ×(
∏n
k=1H
k
i )×Ti︷ ︸︸ ︷
Xn+1i × Ti
The LPS βn−iβi(ti)—i.e., the pushforward of βi(ti) ∈ L(X1−i × T−i) under βn−i—is a
belief about Xn+1−i × T−i
APPENDIX B HIGHER-ORDER PREFERENCES
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is by induction.
Base case (n = 2) It was assumed in the premise that X1i is a standard Borel space
for all i ∈ I. If X is a standard Borel space, then U(X) is a standard Borel space as
well. It follows that H1i = U(X1−i) is a standard Borel space for all i ∈ I.
For all i ∈ I, X2i = X1i ×H1i is a product of standard Borel spaces and therefore
itself a standard Borel space. For all i ∈ I, H2i = U(X2−i) is a standard Borel space
because X2−i is a standard Borel space.
Inductive hypothesis Let n ≥ 2. For all m ≤ n, let Xmi and Hmi be standard
Borel spaces.
Inductive step For all i ∈ I, Hn+1i = U(Xn−i) is a standard Borel space because
Xn−i is a standard Borel space.
Xn+1i is a Borel subset of X
n
i ×Hni . Let κ : Xni ×Hni → Hn−1i ×Hn−1i be the map
(xni , h
n
i ) 7→ (projHn−1i xni ,margpXn−1−i hni ). The map is clearly Borel because it is Borel
in each coordinate. Xn+1i is the inverse image of the diagonal set in H
n−1
i × Hn−1i
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under κ. Since the diagonal set is Borel, Xn+1i is Borel.
Dn−1i ≡ {(hn−1i , hn−1i ) : hn−1i ∈ Hn−1i }
Xn+1i = {(xni , hni ) ∈ Xni ×Hni : projHn−1i x
n
i = margpXn−1−i h
n
i }
= κ−1(Dn−1i )
Proof of Lemma 2. By definition, Hi is the inverse limit of the following inverse system
of standard Borel spaces.
(Hni , f
n
i )n f
n
i : H
n+1
i → Hni = (hn+1i 7→ margpXn−i h
n+1)
The inverse limit Hi exists. Furthermore, Hi is a standard Borel space when endowed
with the subspace Borel σ-algebra of the product
∏
n∈NH
n
i . These results hold under
the premise that fni is a surjective Borel map for all n ∈ N (cf. 17.16 in Kechris, 1995).
Xi is also a standard Borel space because it is isomorphic to the standard Borel space
X1i ×Hi.
Proof of Lemma 3. It is obvious that the map hi is Borel is because the n
th coordinate
of the output is defined by the Borel map hi(·;n) for all n ∈ N.
Let ρ, σ ∈ L(X−i). That ρ ∼= σ =⇒ hi(ρ) = hi(σ) follows naturally from
the definitions of hi and the margp operator—if two preferences are identical, then
so should the marginals of those preferences. We want to show the converse, i.e.,
hi(ρ) = hi(σ) =⇒ ρ ∼= σ.
Without loss of generality, let ρ = (µ1, . . . , µm) and σ = (ν1, . . . , νm) be minimal-
length LPS’s, where m ∈ N. Therefore, both ρ and σ are made up of a linearly
independent components, i.e.,
∀j ≤ m µj 6∈ span({µk : j 6= k}) ∧ νj 6∈ span({νk : j 6= k}).
It follows that there must exist N ∈ N such that margXn−i ρ and margXn−i σ are
minimal-length LPS’s in Lm(Xn−i) for all n ≥ N .
∀n ≥ N margXn−i µj 6∈ span({margXn−i µk : j 6= k})
∀n ≥ N margXn−i νj 6∈ span({margXn−i νk : j 6= k})
It should also be true that margXn−i ρ
∼= margXn−i σ for all n ≥ N because hi(ρ;n) =
hi(σ;n) for all n ∈ N. Preference-equivalence of length-m LPS’s is characterized as
follows.
margXn−i ρ
∼= margXn−i σ
⇐⇒ ∀j ≤ m ∃(αjk)jk=1 ∈ Rj αjj > 0 ∧ margXn−i νj =
j∑
k=1
margXn−i α
j
kµk
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The coefficients {αjk : j ≤ m ∧ k ≤ j} that exist by the statement above must be
unique due to the linear independence of the set {margXn−i µj : j ≤ m}. The coherency
conditions that are built into the definitions of X−i and Xn−i imply that the following
holds for all n > 1.
margXn−i νj =
j∑
k=1
margXn−i α
j
kµk
=⇒ margXn−1−i margXn−i νj =
j∑
k=1
margXn−1−i margXn−i α
j
kµk
=⇒ margXn−1−i νj =
j∑
k=1
margXn−1−i α
j
kµk
In turn, this implies that the coefficients {αjk : j ≤ m∧ k ≤ j} are the same no matter
what the value of n is.13
∀j ≤ m ∃(αjk)jk=1 ∈ Rj ∀n ∈ N αjj > 0 ∧ margXn−i νj =
j∑
k=1
margXn−i α
j
kµk
Furthermore, because the probability measure νj such that extends the measures
{margXn−i νj : n ∈ N} to X−i = lim←−nX
n
−i is unique, as is the measure µj such that
extends the measures {margXn−i µj : n ∈ N} to X−i, the following statement also holds.
∀j ≤ m ∃(αjk)jk=1 ∈ Rj ∀n ∈ N αjj > 0 ∧ νj =
j∑
k=1
αjkµk
This is equivalent to saying that ρ ∼= σ, which is the sought-after conclusion.
APPENDIX C ADMISSIBILITY
Lemma 6. For all (i,m) ∈ I × N, Rmi is Borel.
Proof of Lemma 6. The proof is by induction.
Base case: First, we show that R1i is a nonempty Borel set such that projSi R
1
i = S
1
i .
Let H+i be the nonempty Borel set of Player i’s full-support hierarchies. In the proof
of Lemma C.4 in Brandenburger et al. (2008), it is shown that the set of all σ ∈ L(S−i)
such that a given si is optimal—in the sense of maximizing LEU—with respect to σ
13This is the n from projXn−i .
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is Borel. The following set is obtained by taking finite unions and finite intersections
of Borel sets.
R˜1i ≡ {(si, σ) ∈ Si × L(S−i) : si is optimal w.r.t. σ} ∩ (Si × U+(S−i))
It is therefore a Borel subset of X1i = Si ×H1i = Si ×U(S−i) ⊆ Si ×L(S−i). Then R1i
can be rewritten as the following finite intersection of Borel sets.
R1i =
(
R˜1i ×
∏
n≥2
Hni
)
∩ (Si ×Hi)
Furthermore, a strategy si is admissible if and only it is optimal with respect to at
least one full-support LPS over S−i. Given that, for each ρ ∈ L(X), there exists a
σ ∈ U(X) such that ρ ∼= σ, projSi R1i = projSi R˜1i is equal to the following set.
{si ∈ Si × U+(S−i) : si is optimal w.r.t. some σ}
= {si ∈ Si × L+(S−i) : si is optimal w.r.t. some σ}
= S1i
Inductive hypothesis Let n ∈ N. Assume that R1i , . . . , Rni are nonempty Borel sets
for all i ∈ I. Furthermore, let R˜1i , . . . , R˜ni be nonempty Borel sets for all i ∈ I, where
R˜mi is defined inductively by the following equation. The intersection (· · · ∩Xm+2i ) at
the end implies the consistency of (h1i , . . . , h
m+1
i ).
R˜m+1i ≡ {(si, h1i , . . . , hm+1i ) ∈ R˜mi ×Hm+1i : hm+ii assumes R˜m−i} ∩Xm+2i
Inductive step We want to show that Rn+1i is a nonempty Borel set.
Rn+1i = {(si, hi) ∈ Rni : (projHn+1i hi) assumes (projXn−i R
n
−i)}
= {(si, hi) ∈ Rni : (projHn+1i hi) assumes R˜
n
−i)}
=
(
R˜n+1i ×
∏
k≥n+2
Hki
)
∩ (Si ×Hi)
The set of LPS’s that assume a Borel set is Borel. It is then readily shown that R˜n+1i
and Rn+1i are Borel because the set of all LPS’s in H
n+1
i that assume a Borel set is
Borel.14
From the definitions of Rm−i it is easily shown that the following nesting of sets
holds for all m = 2, . . . , n.
Em ≡ projXn+1−i R
m
−i ⊆ Em−1 ≡ projXn+1−i R
m−1
−i
14cf. Lee (2013)
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These projections are also Borel sets.15 The set of LPS’s that assume a finite sequence
of decreasing nonempty Borel sets is nonempty and Borel. Furthermore, if (si, hi) ∈ R1i
and (projHn+1i hi) assumes E
1, . . . , En, then (si, hi) necessarily belongs to R
k
i for all
k ≤ m.16 Therefore, Rn+1i is nonempty.
Lemma 7. Let S0i = Si and R
0
i ≡ S0i ×Hi for all i ∈ I. Then, the following holds
for all (i,m) ∈ I × N.
projSi(R
m−1
i \Rmi ) = Sm−1i
Proof of Lemma 7. The proof is by induction.
Base case: That projSi(R
0
i \R1i ) = S0i is trivial and immediate. There exists some
h−i ∈ Hi \H+i and S0i × {h−i } ⊆ R0i \R1i .
Inductive hypothesis Let n ∈ N. Let the following hold for all (i,m) ∈ I such
that m = 1, . . . , n.
projSi(R
m−1
i \Rmi ) = Sm−1i
Inductive step We want to show that projSi(R
n
i \Rn+1i ) = Sni . Let E1, . . . , En be
defined as below
∀k ≤ n Ek ≡ projXn+1−i R
k
−i
A full-support LPS σ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ L(Xn+1−i ) can be constructed such that it
assumes E1, . . . , En−1 and the following are true.
∃e∗ ∈ En−1 \ En µ1({e∗}) > 0
µ1(E
n−1) = 1
µ2(E
n−2 \ En−1) = µ3(En−3 \ En−2) = · · · = µn−1(E1 \ E2) = 1
µn(E
1 ∪ · · · ∪ En) = 0
Following the same logic as in the proof of Lemma 6, any (si, hi) ∈ Si ×Hi such that
projHn+1i hi
∼= σ will then satisfy R(n− 1)AR. However, µ1 was constructed so that it
cannot place probability 1 on both En−1 and En simultaneously. It follows that En
cannot be assumed by σ. By definition, projHn+1i hi assuming E
n = projXn+1−i R
n
−i is
equivalent to nth-order assumption of rationality.
15It is not generally true that projections of Borel sets are not necessarily Borel. It is true for these
particular projections of these particular Borel sets.
16If the (n+ 1)th-order belief implied by hi assumes E
k, then the (k + 1)th-order belief implied by
hi assumes R˜
k
i . The converse does not always hold.
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Now, let Ξ be defined as follows.
Ξ ≡ {(ν1, . . . , νn) ∈ L(S−i) : supp νj = Sn−j−i for j = 1, . . . n}
Given any ρ ∈ Ξ, we can find another LPS σ′ ∈ L(Xn+1−i ) of equal length such that
1. The beliefs σ and σ′ are mutually absolutely continuous—i.e., they have the
same null sets; and
2. margS−i σ
′ = ρ.
Note that margS−i σ also belongs to Ξ. A strategy is optimal with respect to a
belief in Ξ if and only if it is n-admissible. It follows that, as long as we can find
(si, hi) ∈ Rni \Rn+1i such that projHn+1i hi = σ, we can find, for each s′i ∈ Sni , another
hierarchy h′i such that (s
′
i, h
′
i) ∈ Rni \Rn+1i .
Proof of Theorem 7. Let S0i = Si and R
0
i ≡ Si×Hi. First, note that projSi R∞i ⊆ S∞i .
The desired conclusion is proven by showing that, for each si ∈ S∞i , there exists some
hi such that (si, hi) ∈ R∞i . For any finite game, there must exist some M > 0 such
that SMi = S
∞
i for all i ∈ I.
As an intermediate step, we want to show that, for all k ≥ M , if (si, ηk) ∈ Rki ,
then there exists some (si, η
k+1) ∈ Rk+1i such that
projHki η
k = projHki η
k+1
i
[Additional details needed for previous step.]
For each (si, η
M) ∈ RMi , fix a sequence (ηM , ηM+1, . . . ) that is chosen as above.
Let η∞ = (h1i , h
2
i , . . . ) ∈ Hi be defined as follows.
∀k = 1, . . . ,M hki = projHki η
M
∀k > M hki = projHki η
k
Therefore, (si, η
∞) ∈ R∞i . Since such η∞ can be found for each (si, ηM) ∈ RMi , it can
be concluded that projSi R
∞
i = projSi R
M
i = S
M
i = S
∞
i .
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